Abstract-The electricity industry throughout the world, which has long been dominated by vertically integrated utilities, has experienced major changes. Deregulation, unbundling, wholesale and retail wheeling, and real-time pricing were abstract concepts a few years ago. Today market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. As power markets continue to evolve, there is a growing need for advanced modeling approaches. Accordingly, this article looks at using software agents to help manage the complexity of electricity markets, particularly retail markets. The article focuses on bilateral trading and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral contracting. Special attention is devoted to the characteristics and negotiation behaviour of Buyer and Seller agents.
I. INTRODUCTION Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets. Electric utility systems were unbundled and replaced with a number of separate business entities dealing with the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power. The deregulation process has led to the establishment of a wholesale market for electricity generation, where competing generators offer their electricity output to retailers, and a retail market for electricity retailing, where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers.
Two major market models have been considered [2] : electricity pools and bilateral transactions. A pool, or market exchange, involves basically a specific form of auction, where participants send bids to sell and buy electricity, for a certain period of time, to a market operator, who in turn analyzes the bids and calculates a market price.
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Bilateral contracts are negotiable agreements on delivery and receipt of power between two traders. These contracts usually involve the sale of large amounts of power (hundreds or thousands of megawatts) over long periods of time (several months to years). Their terms and conditions are set independent of a market operator-although this operator should verify that sufficient transmission capacity exists to complete the transactions and maintain transmission security. Market participants often enter into bilateral contracts to hedge against pool price volatility.
As power markets continue to evolve, there is a growing need for advanced modeling approaches that simulate how market participants may act and react to the changing financial and regulatory environments in which they operate. An agent-based modeling and simulation approach presents itself as a promising approach to model deregulated electricity markets (EMs). Software agents can be designed to act in open and distributed environments, with incomplete and uncertain information, and may efficiently manage cooperative and competitive interactions with other agents.
This work looks at using software agents to help manage the complexity of EMs, notably retail markets. This paper focuses on bilateral trading and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral contracting. In particular, special attention is devoted to the characteristics and negotiation behaviour of Buyer and Seller agents. They are equipped with a generic model of individual behavior and a negotiation framework that handles two-party and multi-issue negotiation. Also, they interact according to the rules of an alternating offers protocol and can pursue strategies motivated by rules-of-thumb distilled from good behavioral practice in real-life negotiations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes two prominent agent-based tools for electricity markets: SEPIA [1] and EMCAS [3] . Section III presents some key features of an agent-based system for bilateral contracting in retail electricity markets, focusing on Buyer and Seller agents. Finally, section IV presents concluding remarks and indicates future avenues of research.
II. SIMULATORS FOR ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Agent-based simulation has been a popular technique to model and analyze deregulated electricity markets over the past decade. This section describes the key features of two prominent agent-based tools for electricity markets.
SEPIA:
The Simulator for the Electric Power Industry Agents was developed by the Honeywell Technology Center and the University of Minnesota [1] . SEPIA models a power system as a set of zones-that is, electrical models made up of single electrical nodes-interconnected by tie-lines. Generators within a zone are owned by generator operating companies (GenCos). A specific generator, the "generator of last resort" (GLR), is automatically assigned to each zone. The generating capacity of GLR is infinite, but its selling price is much higher than that of the other generators. Loads are owned by consumer operating companies (ConCos), which negotiate prices and purchase energy for the loads from the GenCos. The transmission system consists of tielines between zones.
The major components of SEPIA include a number of domain-specific agents, a generic simulation engine, and a graphical user interface. The agents represent generators, loads, GenCos, ConCos, and the transmission system operator. They are constructed as layered components, with each layer adding a specific functionality. Worthy of mention is a learning module incorporating two algorithms: a variation of Q-learning and genetic classifier systems. The general discrete-event simulation engine controls SEPIA simulations and mediates all inter-agent communication. The graphical user interface handles all interactions between the user and the simulations and incorporates four sub-functions: scenario editing, simulation control, property editing, and report management.
SEPIA implements a bilateral contracts market for electricity. Generation company agents control one or more generators-they attempt to maximize profit by establishing attractive bilateral contracts. Consumer company agents are responsible for purchasing energy for each of their individual loads-they try to purchase power for the lowest possible price. Periodically, each consumer company agent determines its hourly power need profile (by aggregating the needs of each of its loads) and broadcasts a "request for quotes" (RFQ) to all generation company agents, regardless of zone. The RFQ contains the power needs for every hour for the next week and will be valid for a short time period. Next, generation companies determine whether to submit a quote for some or all of the power requested by the RFQ. The decision to respond to the RFQ and to determine the price to charge for the energy involves the generation cost function and the megawatt capacities for each specific generator. Once the validity of the RFQ has expired, the consumer company agent evaluates all the quotes it has received and accepts one, many, or none of them.
All contracts that require power to be transmitted across zone boundaries are checked against an available transmission capability (ATC), which is maintained by the transmission network operator agent. Transactions violating transmission limits are not allowed. Generation company agents take on the risk and responsibility of delivering all energy they quoted to consumer agents, meaning that before submitting a quote they need to check the public ATC table and reserve transmission rights as soon as a quote is accepted. The GLR for each zone provides slack, though high-priced, energy so that no load will ever go with any energy requirement left unmet.
SEPIA is intended to allow users to conduct computational experiments regarding the behavior of power systems under a variety of physical and market conditions. The target platform is a microcomputer running a Microsoft Windows operating system. The specific CPU and memory requirements depend on the size and complexity of the computational experiment being conducted. The development and update of agents require the use of a high-level programming language such as C++, Java, or VisualBasic.
EMCAS:
The Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System, developed by the Argonne National Laboratory, is one of the most popular electricity market simulators [3] . Generation companies (GenCos) represent the business units that own generators-they may own a single plant (and operate like an independent power producer) or multiple plants (and be part of a larger corporate parent that provides other products in the electricity market). Demand company (DemCos) represent the business units that sell electricity to consumers, which include residential, commercial, industrial, and other electricity consumers. The physical transmission system is represented by a set of nodes and links that represent buses and lines, respectively. Its operation is governed by decisions made by both the transmission company (TransCo) that owns the facilities and an independent system operator (ISO). Distribution companies (DistCos) own and operate the lower voltage distribution system. They provide distribution services to GenCos and DemCos but do not engage in strategic business practices.
The modeling framework can be described in terms of three main components: agents, interaction layers, and planning periods. The agents are used to capture the heterogeneity of deregulated electricity markets and include (GenCos), (DemCos), (TransCos), (DistCos), (ISOs), consumers, and regulators. They can establish their own objectives, apply their own decision rules, and learn and adapt based on past performance and changing conditions. In particular, they can learn about the market and the actions of other agents using two forms of learning: observation-based learning and exploration-based learning. Their risk preference can be broadly classified into risk-averse, risk-neutral, and riskseeking.
The interaction layers provide the environment in which the agents reside and interact with each other. These layers include a physical layer (representing the system elements that are involved in the physical generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity), several business layers (accounting for pool markets, bilateral contracts markets, ancillary services markets, and the ownership of the transmission and distribution systems as well as the fees charged by these companies for the use of their facilities), and a regulatory layer (representing the regulatory side of the electricity market that establishes market rules and monitors market performance). The planning periods correspond to the different time horizons for which the agents make decisions regarding their participation in the market. Six distinct time scales or decision levels are considered, namely hourly dispatch, and day-ahead, week-ahead, month-ahead, year-ahead, and multi-year planning.
As mentioned above, EMCAS simulates three types of markets: pools, bilateral contracts, and ancillary services. In particular, bilateral contracts are agreements between GenCos and DemCos for the purchase and sale of electricity. The negotiation process is similar to the process outlined above for SEPIA, though there are important differences. A description of this process follows.
DemCos formulate requests for proposals (RFPs) for capacity and energy on the basis of the anticipated needs of their customers and their risk tolerance for exposure to pool market price volatility. RFPs can be of two distinct types: energy deliveries that are constant over all hours of the contract term and energy deliveries that vary over time. Each DemCo's request is based on projections of its customers' future energy requirements and is subject to uncertainty-this uncertainty stems from such factors as weather forecast errors, inaccurate projections of the type and number of future customers, unpredictable variability in customers' electricity consumption patterns, and anticipated future prices of short-term markets.
GenCos analyze RFPs, formulate bid responses, and send them to DemCos. The responses include prices for all or some portions of the requested capacities and energies. They are based largely on projected market prices-projections are a function of historical information that acts as a collection of past experiences. Each GenCo weighs the costs and benefits (i.e., net profits) of entering into bilateral contracts versus selling its energy production on the pool and ancillary services markets. Anticipated net profits are based on projected prices in each of the markets and the costs associated with power production. Production costs are a function of fuel costs, variable operating and maintenance costs, heat rate curves (represented as fuel consumption for blocks of production), and unit start-up and shutdown costs. In addition to net profits, each GenCo also considers other factors into its final pricing response to an RFP, such as risk of rejection.
DemCos evaluate the responses that they receive and either accept or reject the offers. They accept offers (if any) that maximize corporate utility. The decision is based on the offers received and projected market prices. At this stage of the negotiation process, both DemCos and GenCos can revise their marketing strategies and initiate a new round of RFPs-dynamic strategy revision is based on lessons learned from previous bid rounds and newly forged bilateral agreements among market players. The user can control the number of bidding rounds.
Agents' behavior is largely a function of their risk preference, modeled by using a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected multi-objective utility function. For instance, a GenCo that is risk-averse may choose to forgo some potential profits on the pool market and sell its capability and production via bilateral agreements with a guaranteed stream of income. Also, a DemCo that has a low tolerance for price variability may decide to serve most or all of its projected loads via long-term firm contracts. On the other hand, a purely profit-maximizing GenCo may choose to enter solely into pool and ancillary services markets despite high market price volatility if it foresees that it can potentially make more money.
EMCAS is written in Java and uses extensible markup language (XML) for data storage. Java directly supports object-oriented implementation and complex multithreading.
XML is an open, highly portable, and worldwide standard, allowing EMCAS to be easily interconnected with external data sources, models, and tools.
III. BILATERAL CONTRACTING IN A MULTI-AGENT RETAIL MARKET
An ongoing study is looking at using software agents with negotiation competence to help manage the complexity of electricity markets, particularly retail markets, towards ensuring long-term capacity sustainability. This paper focuses on bilateral contracts, either physical or financial, between a buyer and a seller pair. Specifically, this section describes some key features of an agent-based system for bilateral contracting in a retail electricity market.
The major components of the system include a graphical user interface, a simulation engine, and a number of domainspecific agents. The graphical user interface allows users to set agent-specific parameters, specify and monitor negotiation simulations, gather simulation reports, and perform a variety of administrative tasks such as saving simulations (see Figure 1) . The simulation engine does not rely on any domain-specific knowledge and controls all negotiation simulations. The agents are computer systems capable of flexible, autonomous action and able to communicate, when appropriate, with other agents to meet their design objectives. They are currently being developed using the JAVA programming language and the JADE platform. In particular, we are working on the following types of agents:
• Retailer or Supplier agents: represent the business units that sell electricity to consumers; they buy energy from a wholesale market and sell energy to a retail market; • Customer or Consumer agents: include residential, commercial, industrial, and other electricity consumers; • Trader agents: promote liberalization and competition, and simplify dealings between sellers and buyers; • Market agents: analyze the technical feasibility of all negotiated contracts; also, they maintain system security, administer transmission tariffs, and coordinate maintenance scheduling.
The agents are equipped with a generic model of individual behavior (see also [4] , [5] and [8] ). The model accounts for the following key features:
• A set of beliefs representing information about the agent itself, other existing agents, and the market; • A set of goals representing world states to be achieved; • A library of plan templates representing simple procedures for achieving goals; • A set of plans for execution, either immediately or in the near future; each plan is a collection of plan templates structured into a hierarchical and temporally constrained And-tree; the header of each instantiated plan template is referred to as intention.
Buyer and Seller agents are also equipped with a negotiation framework that handles two-party and multi-issue negotiation (see also [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] and [6] ). Negotiation proceeds through several distinct stages or phases, namely a pre-negotiation phase, an actual negotiation phase, and a post-negotiation phase. Pre-negotiation is the process of preparing and planning for negotiation and involves mainly the prioritization of the issues at stake, the definition of limits and targets, and the specification of preferences to rate and compare incoming offers and counter-offers.
Actual negotiation is the process of moving toward agreement and typically involves an iterative exchange of offers and counter-offers. Two agents interact and trade with one another according to the rules of an alternating offers protocol [11] . The negotiation process starts with an agent a i submitting a proposal p 1 i→j to a j in period t = 1. The other agent a j receives p 1 i→j and can either accept the offer, reject it and opt out of the negotiation, or reject it and continue bargaining. In the first two cases the negotiation ends. Specifically, if p 1 i→j is accepted, negotiation ends successfully and the agreement is implemented. Conversely, if p 1 i→j is rejected and a j decides to opt out, negotiation terminates with no agreement. In the last case, negotiation proceeds to the next time period t = 2, in which a j makes a counter-proposal p 2 j→i (see Figure 1 ). The tasks just described are then repeated.
During actual negotiation, the agents make decisions according to their strategies. Typical strategies include:
• concession making or yielding: agents reduce their demands or aspirations to accommodate the opponent; • problem solving or integrating: agents maintain their aspirations and try to find ways of reconciling them with the aspirations of their opponent.
Concession making can take several different forms. For instance, agents can demonstrate good will and make one or more substantial concessions that seek reciprocal concessions. Such overt concessions aim at eliciting counter concessions and are risky. Hence, they are more likely to be made when the opponent is trusted. When trust is low, agents may turn to one of a host of less risky moves. These include fractionation of concessions-agents start with a relatively riskless action and move on toward increasing levels of risk. They make a small concession and wait to see if the opponent reciprocates. If so, they then may feel sufficiently confident to venture a larger concession (see, e.g., [12] ).
Problem solving aims at finding agreements that appeal to all sides, both individually and collectively. The host of existing problem solving strategies includes: 1) logrolling: the parties agree to exchange concessions on different issues, with each party yielding on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority to the other party; 2) nonspecific compensation: one party achieves its goals and pays off the opponent for accommodating its interests.
Logrolling and compensation are two major routes-though not the only routes-to the development of optimal agreements. Logrolling involves an exchange of concessions on issues that are already on the negotiating agenda. In contrast, compensation involves an exchange of concessions on issues that are not on the agenda-one party gets what it wants and the other is repaid on some additional, unrelated issues. The post-negotiation process addresses the closing task of building commitment and implementing a mutually acceptable agreement. Central to this process is the notion of "commitment"-it provides the basis of trust on which agents perform their part of agreement. The degree of commitment to an agreement is established by incurring costs if agents fail to comply with its terms. The larger these costs, the more the agents will regard the commitment as binding.
Negotiation may end in agreement, wherein the parties mutually agree to a proposal, or in no agreement, wherein the parties break off negotiation or reach a deadline. Figure 1 shows a graph of the dynamics of the negotiation process. Such graphs can be generated on the fly during the course of negotiation, and the one in the figure was generated at the very end of negotiation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral contracting in retail electricity markets. Buyer and Seller agents are equipped with a model of individual behavior and a negotiation framework that handles two-party and multi-issue negotiation. They interact according to the rules of an alternating offers protocol and can pursue strategies motivated by rules-ofthumb distilled from good behavioral practice in real-life negotiations.
As this research progresses, we aim to address coalition formation and management, contracts that involve both different levels of commitment and different sanctions for decommitment, and multiple concurrent bilateral negotiations.
